It's never happened before but this fall, or no later than next spring, Gov. Gray Davis seems destined to face a recall election that could well end his governorship.
Davis supporters loudly proclaim this is an unjustified right-wing coup to undo last year's election results. They are right about the right-wing part, but wrong about justification. In fact, this recall is exactly what the Progressive reformers had in mind when they added direct democracy, including recall of public officials, to our Constitution 90 years ago.
The California Constitution provides two ways to remove a governor midterm. One is impeachment by the Legislature for "misconduct in office." Arizona used impeachment to remove its governor some years ago. The second is recall, for which there is no constitutional standard. However, a higher threshold of signatures is required to initiate a recall than to qualify an initiative or a referendum.
REFORMERS MADE IT DIFFICULT
The Progressive reformers, led by Hiram Johnson, made recalling an incumbent office holder difficult, but they gave no particular deference to elective terms of office. Forcing an incumbent to defend himself or herself midterm was quite justified. In fact, when the recall was enacted in 1911, the big debate was over whether to include judges. There was no debate about recalling other elected officials. The people can exercise their recall rights anytime they choose.
The reformers had three criteria in mind to set off a recall: the incumbent has done something very unpopular; he or she is just plain incompetent; or, most important, an aura of ccorruption surrounds the official.
Reformers had special concern over corrupting the elective process. "The recall is the product of a reform era in which there was a great deal of dissatisfaction with political leadership and antagonism toward the 'invisible government' of bosses and machines," wrote Winston Crouch and John Bollens in their classic 1950s study of California government.
Unfortunately for Davis, he scores high on all three criteria.
There is no question of his unpopularity with his record high level of disapproval. His competence is a legitimate issue given his response to the energy and budget crises. But neither of these rise to the level of justification for recall as our founding fathers intended it. It was his corrupting of the elections process that set in motion the events that have led his near certain recall.
LACK OF CHOICE
The most salient complaint of last year's disenchanted electorate was lack of a choice in the governor's race between incumbent Davis and his hapless GOP challenger, novice politician Bill Simon. How did this dismal choice occur? In large part because Davis spent $11 million trashing his strongest opponent in the Republican primary, former Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan, to entice Republicans to nominate their weakest candidate, businessman Simon. They complied; Simon won the nomination and ran a disastrous race for governor.
Here we have the kernel that has now become the tree. Californians voted in record low numbers in November 2002, so disgusted were they with the choice. Nearly half a million newly enfranchised Latino voters stayed away from the polls; traditional swing voters did not vote. Only base voters in both parties took the time to cast a ballot, and Democrats won simply because they have more base voters.
Recall was precisely intended to give voters a second bite at the apple when the election process had been compromised. Davis corrupted it not only by interfering in the opposite party's primary but by creating an aura in Sacramento that his office was for sale in exchange for campaign contributions.
Those contributions were then used to insulate him from the voters both by helping nominate a weak candidate and then by spending millions on negative advertisements to make that candidate an unworthy alternative.
RECALL POSSIBILITY OVERLOOKED
This strategy worked; even with a Republican tide nationally, California voters would not trust the office to Davis' opponent. Davis' handlers did not, however, figure on the possibility of a recall. They spend almost none of his huge campaign war chest defending his record or giving people a reason to feel positive about his stewardship of the office.
It should come as no surprise then that voters have so little confidence in Davis; his re-election campaign gave them no reason for confidence. That's why surprisingly few voters believe this recall is an unjustified power grab. Rather, they see it as the Progressive reformers intended, as their opportunity to pass judgment a second time on Davis and hold him accountable as they were unable to do the first time.
This is where Davis is most vulnerable in the recall; essentially he must now run against himself to hold onto his job while the public will have a ballot brimming with numerous choices of prospective successors.
Rather than hysterical attacks on the propriety of the recall, opponents of removing Davis midterm need to acknowledge that Davis' own conduct in the last election set in motion the recall he now faces. Davis has himself to blame for the mess he is in.