Davis, however, skewed historical fact and fundamentally blamed others as he presented his versions of the energy and budget crises that drove his popularity to record-low levels. Clearly Davis, ever the temporizer, could not bring himself to issue the mea culpas on energy and the budget that might have satisfied voter anger.

Polls indicate that a strong majority of California voters are inclined to recall Davis at an Oct. 7 special election. There are 135 would-be successors on the same ballot, led by Democratic Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante and Republican movie star Arnold Schwarzenegger.

Davis' 20-minute speech to a carefully selected audience of enthusiastic supporters at UCLA was clearly aimed at arresting his popularity plunge -- one that threatens to make him irrelevant as the recall becomes an assumption, and the contest among Bustamante, Schwarzenegger and others takes center stage. And Davis' chief target was Democratic voters, many of whom are ready to jettison him, especially because they have another Democrat in Bustamante waiting in the wings.

That's why Davis sought to characterize the recall drive as "part of a national effort to steal elections Republicans cannot win," likening it to the impeachment of President Clinton and the political and judicial battle over voting procedures in Florida.

"I'm going to fight this recall and the right-wing forces behind it," Davis pledged to cheers. "You can take that to the bank."

The governor described the 2001 energy crisis, which saw Californians experience power blackouts and soaring utility bills, as something foisted on the state by Enron and other greedy energy suppliers. However, Davis glossed over and distorted his refusal early in the crisis to allow utilities to sign long-term supply contracts that would have protected them and their customers from soaring spot market power prices. That refusal has been singled out by even the most objective critics as Davis' chief failure -- one magnified a half-year later when he sought long-term contracts at much-higher prices.

Davis cryptic version: "I refused to give in to pressure to raise rates astronomically." Reality: Rates would have risen only slightly had Davis acted earlier, and they did rise astronomically to pay for the much more expensive contracts his administration signed later.

Davis' semi-apology about energy was confined to, "We made our share of mistakes." He took much the same tack on the budget, saying only that "I could have been tougher in holding down spending when we had a big surplus" and quickly adding that the $8 billion in extra spending that he and lawmakers of both parties sanctioned in 2000 was to finance vitally needed health and education services. "I make no apology for that," Davis said, adding that it was "preposterous" that he had concealed the size of the state budget deficit when he was running for re-election last year.

The record differs markedly from Davis' self-serving version. When the state experienced a $12 billion windfall in 2000, Davis publicly declared that he would stoutly resist pressure from either party to spend it because it likely would be a one-time phenomenon, stemming from a flurry of stock market activity in the volatile high-tech industry. If the money were to be committed to ongoing spending or permanent tax cuts, Davis said then, the state could face massive deficits as future revenues returned to normal levels.

In fact, however, Davis and lawmakers quickly agreed to spend about $8 billion of the windfall on ongoing programs -- tax cuts, education and health care primarily -- and when revenues did return to normal, the state had an $8 billion "structural deficit" that was papered over with bookkeeping gimmicks and loans in the ensuing three years. It leaves the state with an immense ongoing deficit and equally massive debts.

Davis was right to address his roles in those two crises, but he was wrong to offer such obviously distorted accounts of those roles. It was political propaganda, not straight talk.