

POLICE SERVICES
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,
STANISLAUS

Audit Report 08-30
December 17, 2008

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ABBREVIATIONS

ARMS	Automated Response Management System
CALEA	Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies
CBA	Collective Bargaining Agreement
CSU	California State University
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
HR	Human Resources
OIT	Office of Information Technology
POST	Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
SAM	State Administrative Manual
UPD	University Police Department

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As a result of a systemwide risk assessment conducted by the Office of the University Auditor during the last quarter of 2005, the Board of Trustees, at its January 2008 meeting, directed that *Police Services* be reviewed. *Police Services* was last audited in 2000.

We visited the California State University, Stanislaus campus from August 25, 2008, through September 25, 2008, and audited the procedures in effect at that time.

Our study and evaluation did not reveal any significant internal control problems or weaknesses that would be considered pervasive in their effects on police services controls. However, we did identify other reportable weaknesses that are described in the executive summary and body of this report. In our opinion, the operational and administrative controls of police services in effect as of September 25, 2008, taken as a whole, were sufficient to meet the objectives stated below.

As a result of changing conditions and the degree of compliance with procedures, the effectiveness of controls changes over time. Specific limitations that may hinder the effectiveness of an otherwise adequate system of controls include, but are not limited to, resource constraints, faulty judgments, unintentional errors, circumvention by collusion, and management overrides. Establishing controls that would prevent all these limitations would not be cost-effective; moreover, an audit may not always detect these limitations.

The following summary provides management with an overview of conditions requiring attention. Areas of review not mentioned in this section were found to be satisfactory. Numbers in brackets [] refer to page numbers in the report.

PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION [7]

The campus emergency operations plan was not current, and emergency food supplies were not stocked. In addition, automated systems access and data backup procedures needed improvement.

POLICE ACTIVITIES AND CRIME REPORTING [9]

Major incident reporting procedures were not complete.

EVIDENCE, WEAPONS, AND EQUIPMENT [10]

Evidence handling procedures as well as ammunition and weapons inventory control procedures needed improvement.

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The California State University (CSU) Public Safety Program was developed in 1974, commencing with a two-year pilot project on the CSU Northridge campus. A systemwide committee subsequently forwarded recommendations regarding a “public safety approach” for CSU campuses to the chancellor. The chancellor’s Council of Presidents endorsed the recommendations as an appropriate program for the CSU, and thereafter, necessary actions were taken to bring the program to fruition. In 2007, the CSU campus police departments were renamed from public safety to police services to emphasize the service aspect of the campus police departments, and campuses have been adjusting their organizations accordingly.

The CSU residence population has increased greatly over the years, and the problems associated with this growth have been similar to those experienced by small municipal police departments. Sexual assaults, alcohol, drugs, and vandalism increased; and legislation mandated more involvement by university police officers in the investigation and prevention of crimes, as well as care for the victims. As a result, CSU police services departments created policing programs and preventive patrols to deter crime. The growth of on-campus housing also increased the complexity of emergency planning. Furthermore, parking structures were built on campuses, and an increase in auto burglaries and theft necessitated the need for increased patrols.

The Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1989 became Title 2 of Public Law 101-542, The Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act of 1990. President George Bush signed the act into law on November 8, 1990. The act amended Section 485 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 by adding campus crime statistics and security policy disclosure provisions for colleges and universities. This law (now known as the Jeanne Clery Act) applies to all institutions of higher education, both public and private, which participate in any federal student aid programs and requires schools to publicly disclose three years of campus crime statistics and basic security policies. In 1992, the *Campus Sexual Assault Victims’ Bill of Rights* was incorporated into the Jeanne Clery Act. In 1998, the Jeanne Clery Act was amended to expand the scope of campus crime statistic reporting, ensure crime statistics were reported in accordance with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting program, and require the maintenance of a public police log of all reported crimes as well as a policy to issue timely warnings when a crime, reportable in the annual statistics, is known to the school and poses an ongoing threat to the campus. The law was most recently amended in 2000 to require schools, beginning in 2003, to notify the campus community about where public “Megan’s Law” information about registered sex offenders on campus could be obtained.

In California, the Kristen Smart Campus Safety Act of 1998 was signed into law on August 11, 1998. This act requires California colleges to promulgate rules requiring each of their respective campuses to enter into written agreements with local law enforcement agencies, which will: (1) designate which law enforcement agency has operational responsibility for the investigation of violent crimes occurring on campus and (2) delineate the specific boundaries of each agency’s operational responsibility.

In recent years (and in response to increased training standards from the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST), legislatures, and governmental agencies), campus administrators have worked to upgrade the quality of university police services. This has included, but was not limited to, the development of uniform standards for vehicles, equipment, training, emergency preparedness, and critical response units; semiannual meetings of campus police chiefs; and close interaction with Systemwide Human Resources and the Office of Risk Management at the chancellor's office. In April 2001, the chancellor's office issued Executive Order 787, modifying the CSU Public Safety Policy Manual that was required by agreement between the Board of Trustees of the CSU and the Statewide University Police Association. The CSU Police Departments' Systemwide Operational Guidelines were developed and issued by the Systemwide Police Advisory Committee in 2002, and revised in November 2007, with the intent of providing detailed guidance to support the broad and general coverage provided by the Public Safety Policy Manual. Additionally, CSU Los Angeles, CSU Fullerton, and San Francisco State University received accreditation by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA); and most recently, the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Agencies accredited San Francisco State University and CSU Northridge. Sonoma State University anticipates CALEA accreditation in 2009. Lastly, in 2007, administrative and risk management responsibilities for systemwide police services were reassigned from Systemwide Human Resources to the Office of Risk Management.

Throughout this report, we will refer to the program as police services. The titles of the departments assigned responsibility for managing CSU campus public safety and parking operations include, among others, the department of public safety, police and parking services, and the university police department.

PURPOSE

The overall audit objective was to ascertain the effectiveness of existing policies and procedures related to the administration of police services, police activities, and law enforcement, and to determine the adequacy of controls over parking revenues and citations, and crime reporting.

Within the overall audit objective, specific goals included determining whether:

- ▶ Administration and management of the police services program provide an effective internal control environment, clear lines of organizational authority and responsibility, current and comprehensive policies and procedures, and self-evaluation techniques to measure program and management effectiveness.
- ▶ Staffing and scheduling provide appropriate coverage, effective use of overtime and compliance with the collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
- ▶ Police services participation in campus emergency management and the CSU Critical Response Unit are clearly defined, training is provided, and a designated emergency operations center exists.
- ▶ Access to the police services office and automated systems is adequately controlled and limited to authorized persons, data backup procedures are in place, and physical security over system hardware is adequate.
- ▶ Budgeting procedures adequately address police services funding and expenditure, and budget monitoring procedures ensure effective accounting and management control.
- ▶ Chargebacks and POST reimbursements, miscellaneous revenues, and petty cash are adequately controlled, and grants are administered in accordance with grant requirements.
- ▶ The dispatch function is properly controlled, and daily activity logs/records are comprehensive and permit measurement of the effectiveness and efficiency of police operations.
- ▶ Police activities are adequately documented, and access to police services records, investigative files, and criminal offender record information is sufficiently restricted and safeguarded.
- ▶ Crime reporting procedures are well controlled and in accordance with federal and state regulations, and relationships with outside agencies comply with the Kristen Smart Campus Security Act of 1998.
- ▶ Campus safety plan, Megan's Law compliance, and crime awareness programs are in place and in accordance with federal and state regulations.

INTRODUCTION

- ▶ Hiring, certification, and training policies comply with POST, performance evaluation administration is consistent and timely, stipends and compensatory time off are administered in compliance with the CBA, and internal investigations are handled in accordance with state regulations, CSU policy, and the CBA.
- ▶ Crime scene evidence, weapons, and other police services equipment are properly handled, accounted for, and safeguarded, and weapon issuance and use comply with state regulations and CSU policy.
- ▶ Parking revenues are adequately controlled, properly accounted for, and used in accordance with CSU policy and state regulations, and parking citation issuance, processing, and administration are adequately controlled and in accordance with the California Vehicle Code.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The proposed scope of audit, as presented in Attachment B, Agenda Item 2 of the January 22-23, 2008, meeting of the Committee on Audit, stated that *Public Safety* (now *Police Services*) includes primarily police activities and law enforcement including parking program administration and enforcement, and crime reporting. Potential impacts include lack of, out-of-date, or undistributed policies and procedures; underdeveloped or unused measures for self-evaluation and improvement; poor or undefined relationships with external agencies; inefficient use of physical assets or human resources; non-compliance with state-mandated standards and training requirements; unauthorized use of law enforcement data; inadequate crime reporting; lack of control or poor maintenance over sensitive or special equipment; excessive costs; lost parking fine revenue; inadequate control or supervision over activities having safety or liability considerations; and poor adjudication of internal investigations or personnel complaints.

Our study and evaluation were conducted in accordance with the *International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing* issued by the Institute of Internal Auditors, and included the audit tests we considered necessary in determining whether operational and administrative controls are in place and operative. This review emphasized, but was not limited to, compliance with state and federal laws, Board of Trustee policies, and Office of the Chancellor and campus policies, letters, and directives. The audit review focused on procedures in effect from January 1, 2007, through September 25, 2008, along with limited testing of calendar year 2006 records.

We focused primarily upon the internal administrative, compliance, and operational controls provided by the CSU police department's systemwide operational guidelines, campus policies and general orders, and chancellor's office executive orders, and related management activities on campuses, although we also relied on external laws and regulations as well. Most of our work involved the direct interface with police services and parking functions reporting to police services.

Specifically, we reviewed and tested:

- ▶ Procedures for communicating systemwide/campus specific policies, rules, and regulations.
- ▶ Staffing, scheduling, and internal investigation procedures.
- ▶ Fiscal procedures for budgeting, chargebacks, POST reimbursements, grants, stipends, and expenses.
- ▶ Dispatch operations, field reporting requirements, and case monitoring procedures.
- ▶ Procedures for maintaining and securing public safety records, files, and information.
- ▶ Procedures for accumulating and reporting crime statistics.
- ▶ Hiring, certification, and training compliance.
- ▶ Procedures for controlling evidence, weapons, and other public safety equipment.
- ▶ Procedures for controlling and processing parking revenues, parking citations, and parking funds.
- ▶ Data security, disaster recovery, and backup procedures.
- ▶ Disaster preparedness operational procedures if the function reports to police services.

OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CAMPUS RESPONSES

PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

CAMPUS EMERGENCY PLAN

The campus emergency operations plan was not current, and emergency food supplies were not stocked.

We found that:

- ▶ The emergency operations plan document showed an effective date of December 2006. In addition, there was no evidence of a full review and approval within the last year and, as such, we had no assurance that the plan was current, accurate, and complete.
- ▶ The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was not stocked with emergency food supplies at the time of audit, although written plans for food supply purchases had been developed.

Executive Order 1013, *CSU Emergency Management Plan*, dated September 7, 2007, states that each campus is delegated the responsibility for the implementation and maintenance of an emergency management program on campus and for developing a campus plan. On an annual basis or more frequently as needed, the plan should be reviewed, updated, and distributed to the emergency management team members and others as identified by the campus. The policy further states that the campus should establish and equip a functional campus EOC consistent with Standardized Emergency Management System, National Emergency Management System, and Incident Command Systems guidelines and maintain a campus (emergency) roster of resources that includes food and water, with the update/revision date appearing on the roster.

The chief of police stated that a review of the emergency operations plan was not completed and emergency food supplies were not stocked because shifting priorities due to ongoing budget cuts delayed completion of these two projects.

Failure to maintain an updated emergency operations plan increases the risk that emergency responders will not be fully trained in important revisions to the plan, consequently increasing the risk of inadequate response to emergencies, while failure to properly stock an EOC with usable food supplies increases the risk that the campus would be unable to support emergency operations for more than a short period of time.

Recommendation 1

We recommend that the campus update the campus emergency operations plan to ensure that it is current, accurate, and complete, and implement existing plans to stock the EOC with emergency food supplies.

Campus Response

We concur. The campus emergency operations plan will be reviewed and updated. A new 2009 edition will be created, posted, published, and distributed. Food supplies will be acquired for the EOC. Items will be stored in locked kitchen cabinets adjacent to the EOC. Completion by March 30, 2009.

AUTOMATED SYSTEMS ACCESS CONTROLS

Automated systems access and data backup procedures needed improvement.

We found that:

- ▶ Access to the Automated Response Management System (ARMS) was controlled through the university police department (UPD) server, and although annual password changes were required through ARMS, password complexity was not defined, either through the server or through ARMS.
- ▶ Two users had super-user (administrator) rights to ARMS from previous years without a current need for such rights. We also noted that there was no procedure to periodically review ARMS access rights.
- ▶ Backup of ARMS and other operational data was performed daily and weekly with five rotating tapes. However, the backup tapes were maintained on-site in the UPD server room with the source data rather than off-site, and existing policies did not include off-site data backup procedures.

The California State Information Security Office, *Information Security Program Guide for State Agencies*, dated October 2007, states that best practices for access control are for the administrator to establish password standards such as minimum length requirements with a combination of characters and numbers, and appropriate periodic password aging, in order to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the agency's information assets. Best practices for data backup are to establish procedures to implement an agreed backup policy and strategy, including the extent (e.g., full or differential/incremental), frequency, off-site storage, testing, physical and environmental protection, restoration, and encryption. The guide further states that access control refers to the process of controlling access to systems, networks, and information based on business and security requirements. Best practices are to audit access level rights at regular intervals, apply the access method of "least privilege" where access to, or the flow of information, is only granted to the extent necessary to get the job done, and remove access upon employee termination or when the need no longer exists.

The chief of police stated that the UPD was unaware of the password complexity requirements and off-site ARMS backup was not performed or included in written policy because the UPD computer technician position responsible for computer security and backup was eliminated from the department last spring. He also stated that the ARMS super-user accounts still had access to the

system because a periodic review of access rights had not been performed and a policy to do so had not been written.

Inadequate data security controls increases the risk that sensitive data will be breached and that regulatory sanctions for the release of such information could be applied, and failure to provide for adequate storage of backup tapes increases the risk that the data will be unrecoverable should a loss occur.

Recommendation 2

We recommend that the campus:

- a. Develop and implement data security policies and procedures to ensure that password complexity is adequate for both the UPD server and ARMS, and access rights are periodically reviewed.
- b. Update existing backup policies and procedures for ARMS and other operational data to provide for off-site storage and ensure that backup tapes are forwarded to a secure location.

Campus Response

We concur.

- a. The university police will work with the campus Office of Information Technology (OIT) to establish and implement a Standard Operating Procedure for password and access security. Completion by June 8, 2009.
- b. The UPD will work with OIT to relocate the server to the OIT computer center. OIT will perform backup and secure the tapes in a locked vault in a restricted area of another campus building. Completion by June 8, 2009.

POLICE ACTIVITIES AND CRIME REPORTING

Major incident reporting procedures were not complete.

We noted that the campus did not always maintain written evidence of incident reporting to the chancellor's office. Instead, reporting was informal. Additionally, the UPD policy manual provided internal and local major incident reporting procedures; however, it did not provide guidance for reporting major incidents to the chancellor's office.

CSU directive HR 2005-19, *Major Incident Reporting Requirements*, dated April 20, 2005, states that California State University (CSU) presidents or their campus police chiefs (includes public safety directors), are to report all serious and/or fatal injuries and emergency incidents to the offices of the General Counsel and Risk Management at the chancellor's office and that campus police will notify the systemwide CSU police coordinator of major incidents, by telephone or e-mail, as appropriate.

The directive also states that if the incident is ongoing, telephone or e-mail reports should be provided periodically, as needed, and that the final report of major incident should be in writing and mailed or faxed to the CSU police coordinator.

The chief of police stated that major incident reporting had been done by phone and e-mail to the systemwide police coordinator because the method was effective, but formalized recordkeeping of these notifications had not been implemented.

Failure to report all major incidents in writing to appropriate parties at the chancellor's office limits awareness and increases the potential that the overall response to certain major incidents could be inadequate.

Recommendation 3

We recommend that the campus implement major incident reporting procedures ensuring that all specified major incidents identified in CSU directive HR 2005-19 are reported in writing to the appropriate parties at the chancellor's office.

Campus Response

We concur. The university police will establish a Standard Operating Procedure for major incident reporting and an electronic file for storing all such reports and related correspondences. Completion by March 16, 2009.

EVIDENCE, WEAPONS, AND EQUIPMENT

EVIDENCE

Evidence handling procedures needed improvement.

Our review of evidence handling procedures disclosed that monthly, annual, and unannounced inspections of evidence storage areas were not conducted, and a full inventory of evidence, after a recent evidence staff change, had not been documented.

With regard to the UPD evidence listing, we found that 333 items were dated between 2003 and 2007, and an overall review of the status of each aged item was not performed. Additionally, from the listing of 382 evidence items dated from 2003 through 2008, we selected 30 for detailed review. Our review of the evidence and handling procedures revealed the following discrepancies:

- ▶ One item, case number 019948, could not be found.
- ▶ One item was misclassified as "in evidence" with a warrant issued; however, it was adjudicated for disposal or destruction.

- ▶ Two missing items were misclassified as being in the evidence room. Records showed that the items were destroyed and the evidence record was not updated.
- ▶ Five items dated March 17, 2004, through April 27, 2005, were scheduled for disposal or destruction; however, follow-up with the court was not done as of the date of audit.
- ▶ A .357 caliber bullet was mislabeled on both the evidence listing and the evidence card as being a .40 caliber bullet.
- ▶ Confiscated weapons had not been reviewed or disposed of within the required time limitations. Our testing showed that the status of three confiscated weapons had not been reviewed with the court for potential disposal or return to the owner. The cases involving the weapons were dated between September 2004 and February 2005.

State Administrative Manual (SAM) §20050 states that the elements of a satisfactory system of internal administrative control include, but are not limited to, an effective system of internal review and recordkeeping procedures adequate to provide effective control over assets.

California Penal Code §12032 states, in part, that, notwithstanding any provision of law or of any local ordinance to the contrary, when any firearm is in the possession of any officer of the CSU, and the firearm is an exhibit filed in any criminal action or proceeding which is no longer needed or is unclaimed or abandoned property, which has been in the possession of the officer for at least 180 days, the firearm shall be sold or destroyed, as provided for in Penal Code §12028.

The *California State University, Stanislaus Police Department Policy Manual*, dated July 10, 2008, states that (a) on a monthly basis, the supervisor of the evidence custodian shall make an inspection of the evidence storage facilities and practices, (b) unannounced inspections of evidence storage areas shall be conducted annually, (c) an annual audit of evidence held by the department shall be conducted by the lieutenant not routinely or directly connected with evidence control, and (d) whenever a change is made in personnel who have access to the evidence room, an inventory of all evidence/property shall be made by an individual(s) not associated to the property room or function. The policy further states that all property not held for evidence in a pending criminal investigation or proceeding, and held for six months or longer where the owner has not been located or fails to claim the property, may be disposed of in compliance with existing laws upon receipt of proper authorization for disposal. The property officer shall request a disposition or status on all property which has been held in excess of 120 days, and for which no disposition has been received from a supervisor or detective.

The chief of police stated that in early 2008, the position that had oversight of the evidence area for 20 years was eliminated from the department and there was a subsequent internal reorganization, which resulted in evidence inspections (inventories) not being performed.

Inadequate controls over evidence increase the risk of unacceptable evidence at trial, untimely return of property to its rightful owners, inefficient use of evidence storage facilities, and non-compliance with confiscated weapons requirements.

Recommendation 4

We recommend that the campus:

- a. Conduct monthly, annual, and unannounced inspections of evidence storage areas and a full inventory of evidence after an evidence staff change, in accordance with existing written policy.
- b. Perform a thorough review of the status of each aged item on the evidence listing to determine its proper disposition, correct all nomenclature errors, and follow-up with the court of jurisdiction as necessary to resolve the status of confiscated weapons and evidence items scheduled for disposal or destruction.

Campus Response

We concur.

- a. The university police will conduct monthly inspections of the evidence lockers, evidence room, and evidence supplies. Memos of these inspections will be sent to the sergeant and kept in a binder for review. Additional unannounced inspections will also be conducted along with annual inspections of the area. Completion by June 8, 2009.
- b. The university police will conduct a thorough review, correct any deficiencies, and follow-up as necessary. Completion by June 8, 2009.

AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS

Ammunition and weapons inventory control procedures needed improvement.

We noted that:

- ▶ Existing UPD policies did not provide sufficient guidance with regard to ammunition and weapons inventory procedures.
- ▶ The August 1, 2008, Glock model 22 handgun inventory listing showed the same serial number twice, and did not list the serial number of an unassigned weapon found in the armory during our physical inventory on August 27, 2008.
- ▶ An unassigned Remington model 870 shotgun in the armory showed the same serial number of an assigned shotgun; the effect of this being that the March 20, 2008, inventory of shotguns showed the same serial number twice.
- ▶ The August 1, 2008, inventory of Tasers showed the same Taser serial number assigned and listed twice.
- ▶ Periodic physical inventories of weapons were not signed by the preparer.

- ▶ Although all ammunition inventory counts were accurate, existing procedures did not provide for documentation of the purchases and issues of ammunition.

SAM §20050 states that the elements of a satisfactory system of internal administrative control include, but are not limited to, an effective system of internal review and recordkeeping procedures adequate to provide effective control over assets.

The chief of police stated that relatively new staff was given responsibility over firearms controls and procedures and that updated departmental policies were put into effect on July 1, 2008, but needed to be expanded to include firearms and ammunition inventory procedures.

Failure to maintain ammunition and weapons inventory records increases the risk of loss, misplacement, or misuse.

Recommendation 5

We recommend that the campus:

- a. Develop and implement policy and procedures describing ammunition and weapons inventory procedures, including a requirement that physical inventories be signed by the preparer.
- b. Perform a thorough review of the current weapons inventory and correct all errors such as duplicate serial numbers.
- c. Develop, implement, and maintain an ammunition inventory ledger showing purchases, issues, and current stock of ammunition, along with the date of inventory and signature of the person(s) conducting the inventory.

Campus Response

We concur.

- a. A new Standard Operating Procedure will be established identifying the storage of ammunition and weapons at the UPD. Completion by June 8, 2009.
- b. A thorough review of current weapons stored or carried by officers will be completed. A property inventory log of all department issued property will be established and kept locked in the property room. Any duplication of log entries in regards to the Taser or firearms will be corrected. Completion by June 8, 2009.
- c. A new ammunition inventory log will be established that includes a signature page along with the date. An inventory log will be implemented showing all ammunition purchased for the department and what is being issued to the officers. Completion by June 8, 2009.

APPENDIX A: PERSONNEL CONTACTED

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>
Hamid Shirvani	President
Matthew Dillon	Sergeant, University Police Department (UPD)
Suzanne Green	Interim Vice President, Business and Finance
Elizabeth Hodge	Dispatcher, UPD
Steven Jaureguy	Chief of Police, UPD
Amy Lew	Communications Center Supervisor, UPD
Mo Mirza	Campus Auditor, Financial Services
Donevon Murrell	Administrative Analyst/Specialist, UPD
Steven Olsen	Corporal, UPD
Soath Paramy	Information Technology Consultant, Information Technology
Baltazar Reyes	Parking Officer, UPD
Andrew Roy	Sergeant, UPD
Misty Strode	Dispatcher, UPD
Amy Thomas	Assistant Director, Environmental Health and Occupational Safety
Reggie Thompson	Operations Lieutenant, UPD
Kenton Whitfield	Vice President, Business and Finance (At time of review)



CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, STANISLAUS

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

February 2, 2009

RECEIVED
UNIVERSITY AUDITOR

FEB - 4 2009

THE CALIFORNIA STATE
UNIVERSITY

Larry Mandel, University Auditor
The California State University
401 Golden Shore
Long Beach, CA 90802-4210

**SUBJECT: Campus Response to Recommendations of Audit Report 08-30,
Police Services, at California State University, Stanislaus**

Dear Mr. Mandel:

In accordance with the *Policies and Procedures for the Office of the University Auditor*, attached is our campus response to recommendations 1-5 of Audit Report 08-30. The response includes a corrective action plan with completion dates for each recommendation.

Please contact Interim Vice President Suzanne Green if you have any questions or require additional information.

Regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ham Shirvani".

Ham Shirvani
President

cc: Suzanne Green, Interim Vice President, Business and Finance

POLICE SERVICES
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,
STANISLAUS

Audit Report 08-30

PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

CAMPUS EMERGENCY PLAN

Recommendation 1

We recommend that the campus update the campus emergency operations plan to ensure that it is current, accurate, and complete, and implement existing plans to stock the EOC with emergency food supplies.

Campus Response

We concur. The campus Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) will be reviewed and updated. A new 2009 edition will be created, posted, published, and distributed. Food supplies will be acquired for the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Items will be stored in locked kitchen cabinets adjacent to the EOC. Completion by March 30, 2009.

AUTOMATED SYSTEMS ACCESS CONTROLS

Recommendation 2

We recommend that the campus:

- a. Develop and implement data security policies and procedures to ensure that password complexity is adequate for both the UPD server and ARMS, and access rights are periodically reviewed.
- b. Update existing backup policies and procedures for ARMS and other operational data to provide for off-site storage and ensure that backup tapes are forwarded to a secure location.

Campus Response

- a. We concur. The University Police will work with the campus Office of Information Technology (OIT) to establish and implement a Standard Operations Procedure for password and access security. Completion by June 8, 2009.
- b. We concur. The UPD will work with OIT to relocate the server to the OIT computer center. OIT will perform back-up and secure the tapes in a locked vault in a restricted area of another campus building. Completion by June 8, 2009.

POLICE ACTIVITIES AND CRIME REPORTING

Recommendation 3

We recommend that the campus implement major incident reporting procedures ensuring that all specified major incidents identified in CSU directive HR 2005-19 are reported in writing to the appropriate parties at the chancellor's office.

Campus Response

We concur. The University Police will establish a Standard Operations Procedure for Major Incident Reporting and an electronic file for storing all such reports and related correspondences. Completion by March 16, 2009.

EVIDENCE, WEAPONS, AND EQUIPMENT

EVIDENCE

Recommendation 4

We recommend that the campus:

- a. Conduct monthly, annual, and unannounced inspections of evidence storage areas and a full inventory of evidence after an evidence staff change, in accordance with existing written policy.
- b. Perform a thorough review of the status of each aged item on the evidence listing to determine its proper disposition, correct all nomenclature errors, and follow-up with the court of jurisdiction as necessary to resolve the status of confiscated weapons and evidence items scheduled for disposal or destruction.

Campus Response

- a. We concur. The University Police will conduct monthly inspections of the evidence lockers, evidence room and evidence supplies. Memos of these inspections will be sent to the Sergeant and kept in a binder for review. Additional unannounced inspections will also be conducted along with annual inspections of the area. Completion by June 8, 2009.
- b. We concur. The University Police will conduct a thorough review, correct any deficiencies and follow-up as necessary. Completion by June 8, 2009.

AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS

Recommendation 5

We recommend that the campus:

- a. Develop and implement policy and procedures describing ammunition and weapons inventory procedures, including a requirement that physical inventories be signed by the preparer.
- b. Perform a thorough review of the current weapons inventory and correct all errors such as duplicate serial numbers.
- c. Develop, implement, and maintain an ammunition inventory ledger showing purchases, issues, and current stock of ammunition, along with the date of inventory and signature of the person(s) conducting the inventory.

Campus Response

- a. We concur. A new Standard Operating Procedure will be established identifying the storage of ammunition and weapons at the University Police Department. Completion by June 8, 2009.
- b. We concur. A thorough review of current weapons stored or carried by officers will be completed. A property inventory log of all department issued property will be established and kept locked in the Property Room. Any duplication of log entries in regards to the Taser or firearms will be corrected. Completion by June 8, 2009.
- c. We concur. A new ammunition inventory log will be established that includes a signature page along with the date. An inventory log will be implemented showing all ammunition purchased for the department and what is being issued to the officers. Completion by June 8, 2009.

THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY
OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR



BAKERSFIELD

February 11, 2009

CHANNEL ISLANDS

CHICO

MEMORANDUM

DOMINGUEZ HILLS

EAST BAY

TO: Mr. Larry Mandel
University Auditor

FRESNO

FROM: Charles B. Reed
Chancellor

FULLERTON

HUMBOLDT

SUBJECT: Draft Final Report 08-30 on *Police Services*,
California State University, Stanislaus

LONG BEACH

LOS ANGELES

In response to your memorandum of February 11, 2009, I accept the response as submitted with the draft final report on *Police Services*, California State University, Stanislaus.

MARITIME ACADEMY

MONTEREY BAY

NORTHRIDGE

CBR/jt

POMONA

Enclosure

SACRAMENTO

cc: Ms. Suzanne Green, Interim Vice President, Business and Finance
Dr. Hamid Shirvani, President

SAN BERNARDINO

SAN DIEGO

SAN FRANCISCO

SAN JOSÉ

SAN LUIS OBISPO

SAN MARCOS

SONOMA

STANISLAUS